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 Abstract 
The main concern of this paper is to investigate the interplay between sending and recipient 
country characteristics that determine remittance flows and to pay particular attention to the 
transfer channel. The main findings of the paper confirm that there are indeed differences 
between factors that change the volume of remittances and factors that change the delivery 
channel. High levels of Social Capital, as well as a well-developed logistic infrastructure and a 
large shadow economy will increase the share of remittances flowing through informal channels. 
Understanding the factors that cause the discrepancy between recorded and actual remittances 
may help to reconcile the conflicting evidence on the relationship between remittances and 
economic growth, as well as other factors of development. Additionally, if policy makers want to 
promote remittances as a bottom-up development policy (no matter if they are official or 
unrecorded), they cannot only look at cost-factors decreasing the volume of remittances but how 
they affect informal flows, too.  
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1. Introduction 
During the course of the last decade, the rapid growth of recorded international 
remittance flows, surpassing Official Development Assistance and nearly reaching levels of 
Foreign Direct Investment, has created an academic and political interest in scrutinizing 
the determinants of these flows and their impact on economic development. The estimated 
amount of global remittance flows for the year 2013 reaches $550 billion USD and may 
climb up to $700 billion by 20161. But even these numbers are likely to be underestimated, 
since the recording of remittances flowing through informal channels is impossible. 
Especially, South-South remittance flows lack accuracy since a large share of these flows 
goes through family, friends and other alternative money carriers that typically do not 
involve any formal contracts and will thus fly under the radar of national accounts. In fact, 
researchers estimate the amount of informal remittances to exceed the recorded 
remittances by 35 to 250% (Bezard, 2002; Freund & Spatafora, 2005).  
The main concern of this paper is to investigate the interplay between sending and 
recipient country characteristics that determine remittance flows and to pay particular 
attention to the transfer channel. Understanding the factors that cause the discrepancy 
between recorded and actual remittances may help to reconcile the conflicting evidence on 
the relationship between remittances and economic growth, as well as other factors of 
development.  
Due to the lack of a macro-level data base on bilateral informal remittances, most 
authors rely on household surveys on the national level. Freund and Spatafora (2005) 
construct and estimate a model of the determinants of remittances which focuses on the 
cost of sending remittances through formal channels. The authors look at the presence of a 
dual exchange-rate, economic distortions, migration levels, and other unilateral 
                                                          
1 World Bank Migration and Development Brief October 2, 2013 “Migration and Remittance Flows: 
Recent Trends and Outlook, 2013-2016”  
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characteristics. However, the authors do not include bilateral determinants of informality 
and have to restrict their analysis, which is based on household surveys on remittances, to 
only 8 countries due to the limited availability of surveys that actually capture remittance 
income.   
Additionally, most papers analyzing the macroeconomic determinants (in time series, 
cross-section or panel) of remittances solely look at sending or receiving country 
characteristics (Adams, 2009; Niimi, Ozden, & Schiff, 2010; Freund & Spatafora, 2005; 
Gupta, 2006; Faini, 1994; Sousa & Duval, 2010). For instance, Gupta (2006) finds that the 
remittance growth in India over time can be explained by the increase in migration, total 
earnings of migrants abroad, and economic characteristics of the source country of 
remittances. Yet, in her time-series analysis the author does not include time-varying 
receiving country characteristics. The negligence towards the inclusion of bilateral 
determinants is often attributed to data limitations. Most papers look at aggregate 
remittance flows into or out of one single country. In a cross-sectional set-up will make 
bilateral interaction terms redundant by construction.  
This paper will rivet on bilateral factors that determine the costs of informal versus 
formal flows for a cross-section of almost 25,000 country pairs. The paper will contribute to 
the existing literature by making use of a new and more complete data set on bilateral 
remittance flows and will thus provide a global macro-level analysis on the topic of 
informality. The analysis utilizes a sending and receiving fixed-effects OLS and Poisson 
regression and includes bilateral measures for social capital, logistic infrastructure, financial 
infrastructure, and the size of the informal economy to proxy for bilateral costs of informal 
transfer channels.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature on informality and 
uses some stylized facts on informal remittances to illustrate the problem of the channel 
versus size effect. Section 3 will discuss different methodological approaches for the 
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estimation of the costs of informal channels. Section 4 presents the data sources and some 
descriptive statistics, followed by the estimation results in section 5. Section 6 will 
conclude.        
2. Informality of Remittances  
The IMF defines remittances as follows:  
“Remittances represent household income from foreign economies arising mainly from the 
temporary or permanent movement of people to those economies. Remittances include 
cash and noncash items that flow through formal channels, such as via electronic wire, or 
through informal channels, such as money or goods carried across borders. They largely 
consist of funds and noncash items sent or given by individuals who have migrated to a 
new economy and become residents there, and the net compensation of border, seasonal, or 
other short-term workers who are employed in an economy in which they are not 
resident.”2 
There are various ways to transfer money through unofficial channels, going from 
purely private arrangements to much systematized transfers along corporate commercial 
lines.  Pieke, Hear, and Lindley (2007) distinguish between hand carriers (family, friends, 
taxi drivers), dedicated money transmitters (small local businesses responding to the 
demand of money transfers), and remittance transfers in the context of other businesses 
(cash-intensive businesses, particularly outlets with good international communications 
facilities, offering remittance transfer services as a sideline). Additionally, in value transfers 
through the hawala system used in the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, and the hundi system used in South Asia are very common. Usually, the 
migrant gives money to an agent in the host country, who sends the order to a 
                                                          
2 IMF Balance of Payments Report 2012, Appendix 5, p. 272 
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corresponding agent in the country of origin to pay the equivalent amount to a certain 
individual. All of these channels have in common that they are not recorded in the 
national accounts and thus cannot be quantified for a large majority of countries.   
In contrast to the official transfer channels, unofficial transfer mechanisms depend not 
only on the accessibility, speed, and cost of transmission but also on the social structure in 
the sending and receiving country. In their qualitative analysis of informal remittances 
flows Pieke et al. (2007, p.358) suggest that trust is an important factor and that unofficial 
money transfers “are inextricably linked with existing patterns of solidarity and 
reciprocity”.   
Econometrically, the issue of unrecorded informal remittances has been treated similar 
to trade flows. The selection bias caused by the zeroes in bilateral remittance data has 
been addressed with Poisson Maximum Likelihood or Generalized Method of Moments 
estimations (Docquier, Rapoport, & Salomone, 2012; Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). 
However, these merely statistical tools cannot identify whether the zeroes and very low 
levels of bilateral remittance flows are actually reflecting low levels of both informal and 
formal remittances or if the bulk of remittances is informal and thus not comprised in the 
data.  In order to address this problem, it is necessary to carefully analyze factors that 
may influence the channel rather than the volume and to include variables - beyond the 
traditional gravity controls - that capture the costs of formal versus informal remittances. 
If policy makers want to promote remittances as a bottom-up development policy (no 
matter if they are official or unrecorded), they can do so by decreasing the cost of 
transmission. However, they cannot exclusively rely on econometric analyses that 
determine the costs of only formal flows. Some factors may well decrease the recorded 
amount of remittances and thus give the impression of being a cost-intensifying factor, 
whereby in reality, these factors just disproportionately favor informal flows. This is why 
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this analysis focuses on the disentanglement of elements influencing the volume of 
remittances and elements shifting remittances from one channel to another.   
3. Methodology 
3.1 The Direct Approach  
The most straight forward approach to estimating the determinants of informal 
remittance flows is to utilize household surveys that contain information on the amount 
and the sources of the household income. Scaling up the information on the volume and 
the source of remittances and comparing these with the official bilateral flows would 
provide an accurate estimate for the size of informal remittances. This approach will allow 
estimating the impact of social capital, infrastructure, and the shadow economy on the 
volume and the channel of remittances in a direct manner, since it makes informality 
quantifiable.   
However, there are many downsides to this approach. First, the availability of such 
information is limited. Although there are numerous household surveys all over the world 
that capture the households’ main living conditions, most of these surveys fail to uncover 
the origins of remittances (if they record them at all). This makes a bilateral estimate of 
informal remittances impossible. Additionally, discrepancies in the time period of the 
surveys and missing information for many countries limit the comparability and coverage 
significantly and would thus not meet the ambition of a global macro-level analysis. 
Second, financial resources, especially non-labor income, tend to be underreported in these 
surveys (Ravallion, 2003), causing a significant bias when scaling up the numbers to match 
them with national accounts. Third, households that hold large financial resources tend to 
be underrepresented in the survey sample since they are particularly sensitive to 
confidentiality issues and may not participate in surveys or may not respond to certain 
survey questions.  
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Even though Freund and Spatafora (2005, p.6) recognize these weaknesses, they follow 
the direct estimation method based on household surveys in the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, the Philippines, Armenia, Bangladesh, Guatemala, Moldova, and Uganda, 
making rather strong assumptions on issues of representativeness and misreporting. The 
authors claim that “receiving remittances through informal channels is legal in most 
countries, so unlike activities in the underground economy, where participants seek to 
evade taxes, there is no direct incentive for concealment”. Furthermore, they assume that 
underreporting is uncorrelated with the channel of transmission in order to rule out any 
interplay between reported remittance amount and the informality of these flows.  
Nevertheless, Freund and Spatafora’s assumptions are rather restrictive. A direct 
relationship between underreporting and the volume or channel of remittances cannot be 
ruled out completely. Households receiving remittances through informal channels are also 
more likely to misreport on the amount of remittances due to two possible reasons. First, 
informal remittances are typically an irregular source of income. While official remittances 
are likely to be transmitted monthly through bank transfers, informal remittances depend 
on the availability of other transmission channels, like friends or family visiting the country 
of origin and are consequently transmitted in larger and more irregular waves. This 
irregularity makes an accurate reporting of remittances more difficult. Second, even though 
receiving remittances is legal, their effect on the household’s economic situation may have 
consequences beyond additional tax payments. For instance, poor female-headed 
households may fear to reveal their true income (particularly when they receive additional 
unrecorded support from their husbands abroad) in order to not risk losing financial 
assistance from their governments.  
It is thus desirable to develop an approach that makes use of the completeness and the 
coverage of macro-level data and to carefully distinguish between determinants that 
influence the volume or the channel of remittances.  
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3.2 The Indirect Approach  
So far, the literature has restricted itself to estimating the effect of traditional gravity 
variables on the volume of recorded remittances. Well aware of the limitations of the data, 
still, the effects of interest rates, exchange rates, political instability and other factors have 
constantly been interpreted as elements decreasing or increasing remittances in total. This 
does not give space to alternative interpretations, namely that these factors may only 
change the delivery channel rather than influencing the total amount (El-Sakka & R., 
1999; Adams, 2009; Higgins, Hysenbegasi, & Ponzo, 2004). Thus, it is very important to 
interpret the results with caution and to include variables that are more likely to impact 
the costs of informal remittances, rather than formal remittances, in order to account for 
changes of the channel versus changes in volume.  
Remittances are influenced by factors in the sending and the receiving country 
respectively but are also dependent on the interplay between the two countries. When 
trying to detect the costs of informal remittances, it is not sufficient to analyze 
characteristics of solely the sending or receiving country. For instance, financial depth and 
accessibility of financial institutions in the migrant’s host country are undoubtedly an 
important and cost-decreasing factor for official remittances. However, if the household in 
the migrant’s origin country has no means to access a bank account or if the costs of access 
are too high, the importance of financial depth in the host country is virtually zero.  
Nevertheless, the large majority of the specifications in the remittance estimation 
exclusively look at either sending or receiving country characteristics (Lueth & Ruiz-
Arranz, 2008; Freund & Spatafora, 2005; Niimi, Ozden, & Schiff, 2010). This unilateral 
approach neglects the mutual importance of both the sending and the receiving country. 
Contrary to the remittance literature, scholars analyzing international trade flows have 
been more aware of the importance of bilateral determinants of trade. Rauch and Trinade 
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(2002) were the first ones to specifically look at bilateral determinants of trade - beyond 
the traditional gravity variables like distance or regional trade agreements. The authors do 
so by interacting characteristics of the sending country with those of the receiving country. 
Specifically, Rauch and Trinade multiply the ethnicity share in the two countries to proxy 
for the probability that two randomly selected members of each population would 
encounter each other. This approach is motivated by the idea that trade is more likely 
when conducted by an exporting firm who is managed by someone of the same ethnicity of 
the corresponding importer.  
This paper will apply a similar strategy by creating a dyadic variable that interacts 
measures for social capital, financial or logistic infrastructure, and the size of the informal 
economy in the sending and the receiving country. Combining the characteristics of both 
countries will give a more accurate picture of the actual costs accruing to the transmission 
of remittances. The choice in favor of formal remittance channels not only depends on the 
costs occurring in country i but also on the costs and risks arising in the destination 
country.  
The only paper using a constructed bilateral variable to estimate remittances is 
Frankel (2011). Based on the data set of Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008), Frankel confirms 
the smoothing hypothesis, that is to say that remittances are countercyclical with respect 
to income in the worker’s country of origin (the recipient of the remittance), while 
procyclical with respect to income in the migrant’s host country (the sender of the 
remittance). For the purpose of this analysis he constructs a bilateral variable that 
measures the difference in the cyclical position of the host relative to the origin country. 
However, as an additional control variable Frankel only uses the GDP of the sending 
country, not that of the receiving country. The significance of the results may thus be 
driven by variation of the economic cycles in the receiving country, rather than the 
difference in economic cycles of both host and origin country.  
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In order to rule out any doubts about possible unilateral sources of variation, the 
estimation will include sending and receiving country fixed effects. In fact, the paper seeks 
to extract the pure effect of bilateral determinants, independent of the variability in 
unilateral factors like GDP, trade openness, population, geographic condition and other 
variables. Consequently, the regression will follow a sending and receiving country fixed 
effects estimation with only bilateral determinants of remittances. This approach has two 
main advantages. First, estimating gravity equations with importer and exporter fixed-
effects does not involve strong structural assumptions on the underlying model and will 
yield consistent estimates for the vector of bilateral characteristics, especially in a cross-
sectional setting (Head & Mayer, 2013). Second, the fixed-effects estimation rules out 
systematic tendencies of exporters and importers since it will account for any unobservable 
factor that contributes to the overall level of remittances.  This will thus decrease the risk 
of running into an omitted variable bias. Head and Mayer (2013, p. 25) support the 
utilization of fixed effects models in cross-sectional gravity settings in saying that “the 
gravity equation with fixed effects is now common practice and recommended by major 
empirical trade economists”.  
The estimable equation writes as follows:  
                                     
The basic empirical specification is adopted from other gravity models of remittances 
used in the literature (Lueth & Ruiz-Arranz, 2008), where the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of total remittances in US Dollars flowing from country i to country j.     is a 
vector of traditional gravity variables including the log of the physical distance between 
country i and country j, the log of the total migrant stock from country j hosted in 
country i, a dummy for any colonial ties in the past and a dummy for a common official 
language. Other traditional gravity variables, such as population size or landlocked country 
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dummies are captured by the country fixed effects and do not need to be included 
explicitly in the regression.  
The non-traditional vector of control variables     is multi-dimensional and addresses 
factors that are likely to not only influence the volume of remittances but are of particular 
importance for the channel of delivery. It incorporates the infrastructure of the financial 
market, the logistic infrastructure, the level of social capital and corruption, and proxies for 
the size of the shadow economy. All of these variables are designed as interaction terms of 
characteristics of both sending and receiving country.  
Moreover, this analysis will pay particular attention to the interpretation of the 
estimation results. It is clear that the analysis can only give indicative evidence for the 
impact of bilateral characteristics on the channel of remittances since there is no direct 
measure of informal flows. However, the paper will be the first one to carefully differentiate 
between factors that may change the total volume of remittances and factors that shift 
remittances from one delivery channel to the other. Thus, it is necessary to build a strong 
economic intuition behind the expected direction of impact and to match this intuition 
with the results of the estimation procedure.   
3.3 Bilateral Costs of Remittances 
High levels of financial development are expected to increase the share of remittances 
channelled through formal flows as it decreases the relative costs of financial access. 
Evidently, the recipient household needs to hold an official bank account in order to be 
able to receive official remittances. Moreover, if sending and receiving countries are 
financially open, typically these two countries have established various means of financial 
transfers that have proven to be accessible and efficient. Thus, the costs of gaining access 
to these tools are usually lower and will thus shift remittances from informal to formal 
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channels. In general, a well-developed financial infrastructure will decrease the share of 
remittances flowing through informal channels.    
On the other hand, a well-developed infrastructure will equally decrease the costs of 
informal flows. As informal remittances are usually transferred via friends and relatives, 
the rural-urban connectedness and means of transport are important determinants for the 
costs of informal remittances. For instance, if a remote village on the countryside is hardly 
accessible to the courier of the remittances, it may be more feasible for the recipient 
household to undertake a monthly trip to a bank in an urban area nearby and receive 
official transfers through their bank accounts rather than unofficial remittances through 
family and friends.  
Consequently and equally important as the financial infrastructure, the logistic 
infrastructure needs to be strong as well, in order for informal flows to be more cost-
efficient. Since the logistic and the financial infrastructure are likely to be correlated, the 
effect of these measures is a priori ambiguous.  
Another important determinant for the costs of informal flows is the trust between 
individuals in both societies. High levels of distrust among citizens will increase the cost of 
remittances. Again, it is important to look at social capital in both countries since the 
decision on which channel to use for transmission depends on the trust in the local society 
and the destination society.  
Many studies show that informal remittances are not only transferred through close 
friends and relatives but also through other types of couriers. In South Africa, for instance, 
two informal tools seem to predominate: using friends and taxi drivers as money carriers 
(Analytics-Genesis, 2003). If the general distrust is high among members of the society, 
then the remitter faces a higher risk to use these informal channels (such as taxi drivers or 
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private carrier systems) and may switch to formal remittance flows which demand only 
very few  interactions with other individuals.  
Lastly, informal remittances will be more likely in countries that have a pronounced 
shadow economy. When informality of employment, production and financial transactions 
is common in both sending in receiving countries this will strengthen the infrastructure for 
informal money transfers and thus decrease the cost of informal remittances. Consequently, 
large shadow economies are expected to shift money from official to non-official channels.  
4. Data 
4.1 Data Sources  
Since 2010, the World Bank annually publishes a data set on bilateral remittance flows 
between 212 countries. This paper makes use of the data set on remittances in 2011, which 
comprises bilateral remittance flows in current USD for 24,647 country pairs.  
The right-hand side variables include measures for the quality of the financial market, 
quality of logistic infrastructure, social capital, and the shadow economy.  
The measures for the quality of the financial market are two-fold.  First, financial 
accessibility as measured by the share of adults with an account at a formal financial 
institution. Second, financial openness, as measured by the Chinn-Ito Financial Openness 
Index (Chinn & Ito, 2008).  The index is aimed at measuring the extensity of capital 
controls based on the information from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).It takes on negative and positive 
values and is constructed around a zero mean. The index takes higher values the more 
open the country is to cross-border capital transactions. For the purpose of this paper, the 
Chinn.-Ito Index is not centered around the zero mean, but shifted to only take positive 
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values since a multiplication of the negative Index in country i and country j would yield a 
misleading positive combined financial openness index.  
Turning to the logistic infrastructure, the paper makes use of two different measures.  
On the one hand, a systemic measure of logistic infrastructure, namely the World Bank 
Index of Port Infrastructure, that ranges from 1 (=extremely underdeveloped) to 7 
(=extremely developed) and on the other hand a direct proxy for the accessibility of 
remote rural areas, captured by the road density as kilometers of road per 100 square 
kilometers of land area.  
All of the measures for financial and logistic infrastructure with the exception of the 
Chinn-Ito-Index are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator Database 
for the year 2011. Traditional bilateral gravity controls are taken from the French research 
center in international economics, CEPII. 
Proxies for social capital are taken from two main sources. Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which is an annual ranking of countries 
by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion 
surveys. The CPI currently ranks 176 countries on a scale from 100 (very clean) to 0 
(highly corrupt).  An additional measure of social capital is taken from the World Value 
Survey, which consists of nationally representative surveys conducted in six waves from 
1981 to 2014. Survey participants are asked, among other things, if they agree or not agree 
with the statement that generally “most people can be trusted”. The average positive 
response rate to this question is used as a proxy for social capital in the society and is 
available for 50 countries in the wave between 2010 and 2014.  
Estimates for the shadow economy as a share of total GDP are taken from Schneider 
(2005), comprising data for 161 countries in the year 2000, reaching from 9% to over 70% 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The highest bilateral channel of remittances is between the United States and Mexico 
and reaches almost 23 Billion USD in 2011. The majority of official bilateral remittances - 
more than 70 percent - are zero. The main passages of zero remittances are between 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and also from high income OECD countries to countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Those two channels constitute more than 10% of total zero flows. 
In general, Sub-Saharan Africa as well as Latin America and the Caribbean are the regions 
that seem to neither send nor receive remittances.  However, the size of the migrant 
community would predict otherwise. Typically, remittances rise proportionately to the 
migrant stock (see Figure 1) but although Latin America and the Caribbean have the 
third largest stock of migrants in the world, they still belong to the world regions that are 
not sending remittances at all (see Table 1 and Table 2).  
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Figure 1: Scatterplot of log of Remittances and log of total Migrant Stock 
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        Table 2: Migrant Stocks (in Millions) in Regions Sending and Receiving Remittances  
Receiving Regions 
 
Percent Sending Regions 
 
Percent 
High-income OECD members 49 53 Europe and Central Asia 23 25 
Europe and Central Asia 17 18 High-income OECD members 18 19 
South Asia 8,1 9 Latin America & the Caribbean 14 15 
Sub-Saharan Africa 7,4 8 South Asia 13 14 
High-income non-OECD members 5,8 6 Sub-Saharan Africa 8,8 10 
Latin America & the Caribbean 2,4 3 East Asia and Pacific 8,5 9 
Middle East and North Africa 1,6 2 Middle East and North Africa 5,6 6 
East Asia and Pacific 1,2 1 High-income non-OECD members 1,6 2 
 
Consequently, the question arises: why do these regions not send or receive any 
remittances, despite the noticeable migrant community?  Most likely, there are two factors 
at play. First, the low levels of financial accessibility in these countries may increase the 
cost of remittances to a point, where the transfer of money is not feasible anymore (volume 
effect). Second, high social capital and a well-developed informal economy may decrease 
the cost of informal flows to a point, where it is less costly to send remittances though 
unrecorded channels (channel-effect). Officially, these remittance channels appear as zero, 
because the bulk of remittances flows through informal channels.  
Table 1: Zero Bilateral Remittance Flows by Sending and Receiving Regions 
  
Receiving Regions Freq. Percent Sending Regions Freq. Percent 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4,123 23.29 Sub-Saharan Africa 5,178 29.25 
Latin America & the Caribbean 3,179 17.96 Europe and Central Asia 2,734 15.44 
High-income OECD members 3,097 17.49 Latin America & the Caribbean 2,613 14.76 
Europe and Central Asia 2,271 12.83 East Asia and Pacific 2,290 12.94 
East Asia and Pacific 1,886 10.65 Middle East and North Africa 1,613 9.11 
Middle East and North Africa 1,191 6.73 High-income non OECD members 1,206 6.81 
High-income non OECD members 1,072 6.06 South Asia 1,189 6.72 
South Asia 884 4.99 High-income OECD members 880 4.97 
Total 17,703 100 Total 17,703 100 
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A closer look at some key variables that determine the cost of remittances reveals that 
country pairs that do not have any recorded transactions are on average less financially 
open and accessible and are logistically less developed. They are also typically more 
corrupt and have a larger shadow economy (see Table 3). This supports the initial 
observation that particularly countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the 
Caribbean remit very little.  
Table 3: Differences in Key Variables for zero remittances and positive remittances 
 
 
zero 
remittances 
positive 
remittances 
   
Financial Accessibility (bank accounts per 1000 adults) 38.46 66.61 
Logistic Accessibility (km of road per 100 sq. km of land area) 79.36 105.50 
Infrastructure (World Bank Index of Port Infrastructure) 3.94 4.75 
Social Capital (Corruption Perception Index) 38.51 57.70 
Financial Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) 2.15 3.50 
Informality (size of the shadow economy as share of GDP)  38.74 29.38 
 
Usually, gravity equations on remittances include vectors of unilateral characteristics 
for either the sending or receiving country, such as GDP, geographic, and demographic 
determinants. The vector of bilateral variables usually includes the migrant stock, the 
physical distance, and dummies for the same language and colonial ties. Replicating those 
standard regressions with the help of sending and receiving country fixed effects (instead of 
the unilateral variables vectors) and analyzing the residuals of the standard gravity 
estimation, will shed some light on what may have been overlooked. This method will also 
validate the choice of the key variables determining costs of remittances that have 
previously remained unnoticed.  
Figure 2 shows that the accuracy of the standard gravity estimation decreases with 
high levels of corruption (high CPI is equivalent to low corruption). That is, in countries 
where both recipient and sender are highly corrupt the standard model fails to account for 
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a large share of the variation in the data. This confirms the prior of the paper on the fact 
that social capital is an important component when analyzing the cost of remittances.  
Additionally, when looking at the country pairs that exhibit large residuals, it becomes 
evident that these pairs usually have very particular relationships. These connections 
cannot only be captured though cultural or geographic proximity. Figure 3 takes two 
examples of country pairs whose actual remittance values differ largely from the estimated 
flow. On the one hand, there is the flow between Israel and Lebanon which is typically 
overestimated by the standard gravity equation and on the other hand the flow between 
the United States and Mexico that tends to be underestimated by the traditional gravity 
estimation. Again, these large inaccuracies occur because important bilateral determinants 
of remittances are omitted in the standard estimation.  
 
 
The geographic proximity of Lebanon and Israel may lead to believe that these two 
countries must engage in extensive remittance transaction. However, this ignores the socio-
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Figure 2: Residuals of standard gravity estimation with FE and the combined level of corruption 
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political determinants of those interactions. Indeed, the combined CPI for Lebanon and 
Israel lies well below the mean level of combined CPI for the full sample, indicating that 
the level of general trust in a society is an important determinant.  
Conversely, remittance flows between the United States and Mexico cannot solely be 
explained by the high stock of Mexican migrants in the US. There needs to be an 
additional factor that intensively promotes remittances between these two countries. Since 
US-Mexico migration has become one of the main channels of remittances and migration in 
the world more efficient and less costly channels of delivery may have been developed over 
time as a response to the great demand for financial institutions. It is therefore expected 
that not only the official flows are underestimated by the model, but also that the large 
share of remittances might flow though informal channels. A strong and well-connected 
diaspora and a developed logistic and financial infrastructure facilitate the establishment of 
informal transmission arrangements.     
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Figure 3: Residuals of standard gravity estimation with FE and Fitted Values,  
corrected by the mean residual of the sending country 
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Furthermore, the literature on trade potential can be useful in analyzing possible 
remittance flows. The difference between the observed and the predicted trade flows are 
typically interpreted as un-exhausted trade potential (Egger, 2002; Wang & Winters, 
1992). Applied to the remittance context, all country pairs that exhibit a negative residual, 
that is whose remittance flows are overestimated, channel the difference between actual 
and predicted remittances through informal channels. Table 4 lists the country pairs with 
the highest discrepancies between actual and estimated remittance amount. Following the 
logic on trade potential, the right column of Table 4 predicts the country pairs with the 
highest informal flows. Consequently, we would expect that the informal remittance flows 
are the highest for Lebanon and Israel and Nepal and Bangladesh.  
Table 4: Country Pairs with highest residuals  
 
Underestimation (positive residual) Overestimation (negative residual) 
Sending Receiving Sending Receiving 
Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina Belgium Croatia 
Czech Republic Vietnam Guatemala Vietnam 
Iran Afghanistan Israel Lebanon 
Slovenia Bosnia and Herzegovina Nepal Bangladesh 
Sudan Nigeria Portugal Afghanistan 
 
With the exception of a few, most country pairs are either neighboring countries or 
only separated by one country. Apparently, some other forces are at play between these 
countries that cannot be explained by the physical distance. The following estimation will 
include bilateral, cost-determining factors that have been overlooked in the standard 
gravity equations. This may help to shed some light on particularities of certain country 
pairs. 
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5. Estimation Results  
This section will apply the methodology described in section 3.2. For reasons of 
robustness, section 5 will report on the results of receiving country fixed effects, sending 
and receiving country fixed effects, and estimations for different subsamples, particularly 
South-South and North-North passages of remittance flows and estimations of remittances 
flowing between neighboring countries. Both Ordinary Least Squares and the Poisson 
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood methods will be applied as suggested by Silva and Tenreyro 
(2005) to deal with the selection bias caused by the log-linearization of zero remittance 
values.  
For all regressions for social capital, financial and logistic infrastructure, as well as 
informality the traditional gravity variables are significant and exhibit the expected sign. 
The higher the migrants stock from country j hosted in country i, the higher the 
remittances. Similarly, past colonial ties between country pairs or having the same official 
language will also increase remittance flows. The coefficient of physical distance between 
countries, as a proxy for transport costs, is significant throughout all specifications and 
exhibits the expected negative sign.  Both the migrant stock and the geographic distance 
are in logs and can be interpreted as elasticities (that is a one percent increase in the 
migrant stock will increase total official remittances by about 0.5%). 
All of the key indicators are in absolute terms and not in logs since most of them 
represent shares and are thus limited to a maximum value of 1. Log-linearizing values 
below one would turn them negative and a large schare of the variation would be lost 
thorugh the log-linearization. With this approach we follow the specificational conventions 
in the trade literature and particularly rely on Head and Mayer (2013) and Rauch and 
Trinade (2002).    
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5.1 Social Capital  
As suggested in previous sections, social capital is one of the main determinants for the 
cost of formal and informal remittances and is expected to favor informal flows, as it 
decreases the risk of transmitting money through alternative channels like taxi drivers.  
Table 5 reports the estimation results for social capital, using the Corruption 
Perception Index and the World Value Survey as proxies. Consistently, in all four models, 
the interacted Corruption Perception Index is negative and significant at the 1 to 5 percent 
level. This suggests that lower levels of corruption and higher levels of trust among 
individuals decrease the flows of official remittances. This result holds even if one controls 
for the level of income in both sending and receiving country, which rules out the doubt 
that a high CPI merely reflects high income pairs that naturally exhibit low levels of 
remittances.  
The result is in line with the observations of Pieke, Hear, and Lindley (2007), who 
show that trust is an important cost-decreasing factor of informal remittances. High levels 
of trust in both host and origin country of the migrant will decrease the cost of informal 
flows and thus shift remittances from the formal to the informal channel.   
Considering the World Value Survey (WVS), which measures the share of people in a 
country that agree with the statement that in general people can be trusted, the results are 
consistently insignificant. Although exhibiting a negative sign and thus in line with the 
theory, using the WVS is not sensible due to the limited availability of data. The 
observations decrease from more than 4000 for the combined CPI to only 600 for the 
WVS. This lack of coverage and the selection bias caused by the availability of information 
(WVS only available for high- and middle-income countries) leads to a biased estimate 
that shall not be considered in the further analysis. 
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Table 5: Social Capital Estimation Results 
 
 
CPI WVS CPI WVS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
OLS Poisson OLS Poisson OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
         
GDP i 0.631*** 0.0432*** 0.997*** 0.0642***  
   
Population i -0.426*** -0.0316*** -0.842*** -0.0540***  
   
Area i 0.139*** 0.0095*** 0.143*** 0.0089** 
    
Landlocked i -0.215*** -0.0188 -0.156 -0.0108 
    
         
Migrant Stock ij 0.489*** 0.036*** 0.446*** 0.029*** 0.417*** 0.0316*** 0.3398*** 0.0236*** 
Distance ij -0.625*** -0.039*** -0.575*** -0.0376** -0.6719*** -0.0422*** -0.6756*** -0.0420** 
Colony ij 0.762*** 0.0385** 0.681** 0.0348 0.890*** 0.0488** 0.5251** 0.0269 
Language ij 1.254*** 0.0876*** 0.970*** 0.0633** 0.841*** 0.0592*** 0.9218*** 0.0581 
         
         
Social Capital i 0.0263*** 0.0021*** 2.3032*** 0.1709 
    
Social Capital ij -0.000185*** -0.0000194** -1.937551 -0.1701 -0.000178*** -0.0000203** -1.9865 -0.16962 
         
         
Observations 4177 4177 600 600 4242 4242 600 600 
R-squared 0.7622 0.1155 0.7612 0.1001 0.8594 0.1301 0.8687 0.1129 
Sending Country FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Receiving Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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5.2 Financial and Logistic Infrastructure  
In section 3, the paper has already constituted that the economic intuition behind the 
financial and logistic infrastructure is ambiguous, since a well-developed infrastructure will 
help both formal and informal remittances to be more cost-efficient.  
The estimation results mostly confirm that the bilateral financial and the logistic 
infrastructure variables decrease the official remittance flows. Whereas this may be 
surprising for the financial accessibility variable (more bank accounts means better access 
to formal remittances), a second look at the data helps to solve this puzzle. Financial 
accessibility is strongly and significantly correlated with other proxies for logistic 
infrastructure. The variation in financial accessibility may thus reflect large parts of the 
variation of the logistic infrastructure measures.  
The Chinn-Ito Index for financial openness seems to present a similar puzzle: If both 
countries are more financially open the official flow of remittances decreases. However, the 
Chinn-Ito Index does not measure openness towards official flows but openness in terms of 
capital controls. A high Chinn-Ito Index is equivalent to low restrictions (on the 
acquisition of currencies, for example). Non-restrictive monetary policies liberalize the 
transactions and lead to a less intense control of financial transactions, which makes 
unofficial transfers easier.    
The negative sign of the port infrastructure index and the road density confirm the 
hypothesis that rural-urban connectedness and an efficient logistic system helps to decrease 
the cost of informal remittances. This channel effect seems to overweigh the volume effect, 
since the better infrastructure seems to decrease rather than increase the recorded formal 
flows. These results show how important a careful interpretation of these variables is, since 
a well-developed infrastructure does not necessarily mean lower remittances, but that these 
remittances may just be transferred informally. 
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Table 6a: Financial and Logistic Infrastructure Estimation Results  
 
 
Bank Accounts Chinn Ito Index Port Infrastructure  Road Density  
    
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
OLS Poisson OLS Poisson OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
         
GDP i 0.589*** 0.0389*** 0.799*** 0.056*** 0.636*** 0.044*** 1.014*** 0.068*** 
Population i -0.490*** -0.033*** -0.611*** -0.044*** -0.416*** -0.0314*** -0.847*** -0.0580*** 
Area i 0.177*** 0.011*** 0.136*** 0.0092*** 0.156*** 0.0105*** 0.149*** 0.0094*** 
Landlocked i -0.408*** -0.031** -0.269*** -0.020* 0.081 0.0038 -0.1757** -0.0133 
 
        
Migrant Stock ij  0.492*** 0.0353*** 0.517*** 0.037*** 0.4997*** 0.0362*** 0.4791*** 0.0327*** 
Distance ij -0.581*** -0.037*** -0.556*** -0.034*** -0.535*** -0.0330*** -0.422*** -0.028*** 
Colony ij 0.574*** 0.023 0.741*** 0.036** 0.764*** 0.0368** 0.651*** 0.0313 
Language ij 1.358*** 0.093*** 1.269*** 0.0902*** 1.119*** 0.0765*** 1.342*** 0.084*** 
 
        
 
        
Infrastructure i 0.0187*** 0.0014*** 0.0768* 0.0073 0.7082*** 0.0554*** 0.0019*** 0.0001454 
Infrastructure ij -0.000085*** -0.0000084* 0.00745 -0.00031 -0.0634*** -0.00588 -0.000018*** -0.00000148** 
                  
Observations 3506 3506 4179 4179 3715 3715 1994 1994 
R-squared 0.7501 0.1082 0.7611 0.1177 0.7738 0.1118 0.7540 0.0886 
Sending Country FE No No No No No No No No 
Receiving Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6b: Financial and Logistic Infrastructure Estimation Results  
 
 Bank Accounts Chinn Ito Index Port Infrastructure Road Density 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 OLS Poisson OLS Poisson OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
         
Migrant Stock ij 0.418*** 0.0309*** 0.431*** 0.032*** 0.419*** 0.0313*** 0.452*** 0.0317*** 
Distance ij -0.706*** -0.0458*** -0.683*** -0.042*** -0.629*** -0.0391*** -0.701*** -0.0454*** 
Colony ij 0.809*** 0.0403* 0.861*** 0.047** 0.932*** 0.0503** 0.677*** 0.0355 
Language ij 0.842*** 0.0587*** 0.836*** 0.059*** 0.747*** 0.0498*** 0.619*** 0.0389 
 
        
Infrastructure ij -0.000092*** -0.000010** -0.034*** -0.0038*** -0.0654*** -0.0065** -0.00002*** -0.00000169** 
 
        
Observations 3506 3506 4179 4179 3715 3715 1994 1994 
R-squared 0.8560 0.1232 0.8701 0.1327 0.8659 0.1297 0.8688 0.1012 
Sending Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Receiving Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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5.3 Informality 
The size of the shadow economy of a country is likely to be the most direct measure 
for the channel effect.  The average size of the shadow economy (in percent of official 
GDP) over 1999-2000 in developing countries is 41%, in transition countries 38% and in 
OECD countries 18.0%. This is in line with the presumption that especially in developing 
countries (and in particular Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean) 
informal remittance flows are high. Schneider (2005) finds that the increasing burden of 
taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulatory activities 
are the driving forces for the growth and size of the shadow economy. Similar forces stand 
behind the choice to remit through the informal channel. Consequently, the size of the 
shadow economy is a good proxy for the size of informal flows.  
The estimation confirms this hypothesis. The size of the informal economy consistently 
decreases official remittance flows, in both simple OLS and the Poisson estimation and is 
highly significant throughout all specifications. This may be driven by two factors, a direct 
and a indirect effect of the shadow economy. First, a strong informal economy can only 
exist if the infrastructure for informal transactions of labor and capital are also well-
developed. Informal remittance flows can benefit from these existing structures which  
decrease the cost of transfer (direct effect). Second, a strong informal economy is reflecting 
a specific socio-political set-up. On the one hand, the state is strong enough to impose 
taxes and social contributions for official contractual employment relations, on the other 
hand the state is too weak to limit illegal employment and to control the black market. 
Thus, a large shadow economy is only a symptom of this particular socio-political set-up 
which incites informal remittances and at the same time offers fruitful ground for them 
(indirect effect). Both effects are clearly determining the channel of transfer rather than 
the volume. In other regressions (not reported) alternative measures of informality, such as 
the share of informal employment over total employment, showed no significance. 
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However, this can be attributed to the low coverage of data: informal employment 
statistics are only available for 33 countries.   
In order to rule out any mechanisms of the shadow economy on remittances that go 
through corruption, this paper makes use of the results of Dreher and Schneider (2010) 
who find that there is no robust relationship between corruption and the size of the 
shadow economy when perceptions-based indices of corruption are used. We can thus be 
confident that the shadow economy accurately reflects remittances switching from one 
channel to another and that they do not decrease the volume of remittances thorugh 
higher levels of corruption. 
Table 7: Estimation Results Shadow Economy 
  
 
Informality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
     
GDP i 0.615*** 0.0412*** 
  
Population i -0.517*** -0.0374*** 
  
Area i 0.157*** 0.0108*** 
  
Landlocked i -0.385*** -0.0311** 
  
     
Migrant Stock ij 0.503*** 0.0368*** 0.4222*** 0.0317*** 
Distance ij -0.585*** -0.0373*** -0.6896*** -0.0432*** 
Colony ij 0.703*** 0.0347** 0.8704*** 0.0477** 
Language ij 1.232*** 0.0844*** 0.7719*** 0.0537*** 
     
Informality i -0.0133*** -0.00070 
  
Informality ij -0.00037*** -0.000037** -0.0004136*** -0.0000438** 
     
     
Observations 4061 4061 4098 4098 
R-squared 0.7664 0.1157 0.8613 0.1296 
Sending Country FE No No Yes Yes 
Receiving Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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5.4 Subsample Regression 
The main prior of the paper is that the official statistics on remittances do not reflect 
the real financial flows between two countries. This is particularly the case for country 
pairs that have very low costs for informal flows and for country pairs that have no access 
to formal transmission channels. Hence, one can expect that for these countries actual and 
reported remittance data deviate very strongly from each other. This large data inaccuracy 
is expected to cause a loss of significance of the key variables (social capital, infrastructure, 
and informality).  
 
To confirm this hypothesis, the key regressions from section 5.1 to 5.3 are replicated 
using subsamples for country pairs that have little access to formal transmission channels. 
Country pairs that are below the median level of combined GDP are most likley to be less 
financially developed and typically have high costs of accessing formal means of transfer. 
Conversely, neighboring country pairs are expected to have very low costs of informal 
Table 8: Subsample Regression with rich, poor, neighboring and non-neighboring country pairs 
 
Above Median Combined GDP Below Median Combined GDP 
Neighboring 
Countries 
Non-
Neighboring 
Countries 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
OLS Poisson OLS Poisson Poisson Poisson 
       
Bank 
Accounts 
-0.0001506*** -0.0000142*** 0.000208 0.0000282 0.0000142 -0.0000119** 
Chinn-Ito 
Index 
-0.060792*** -0.0059251** -0.0020856* 0.0005882  -0.0008588 -0.0047476** 
Port 
Infrastructure 
-0.061707*** -0.0061529* -0.0509597 -0.0042332 -0.0162372 -0.0068429** 
Road Density  -0.0000201*** -0.00000162** -0.00000607 0.00000127 -0.000000337 -0.00000162** 
CPI -0.0002074*** -0.0000214** 0.0003953 0.0000383 0.000048 -0.000023** 
Shadow 
Economy 
-0.0004228*** -0.0000417** -0.0000361 -0.00000163 0.0000082 -0.0000505*** 
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transfers, beyond the mere geographic proximity. For instance, temporal labor migration 
among neighboring countries that are not officially recorded and frequent back and forth 
movement across countries favor informal flows. Additionally, transferring money to the 
neighboring country does not necessarily require the involvement of money carriers or 
other intermediate stages of transfers, which lowers the requirements towards social capital 
and other key cost-determining factors.  
The subsample regressions confirm that the significance mainly stems from country 
pairs that are above the median of interacted GDP and non-neigboring countries. All the 
key variables have the expected negative and significant coefficient in both the Poisson and 
the OLS regressions for North-North and non-neighboring passages of remittance flows. 
This supports the initial expectation of the paper that the data is most inaccurate for 
country pairs that have high costs for formal remittances and very low costs for informal 
remittances3.  
6. Conclusion  
The aim of this paper was to to investigate the interplay between sending and 
recipient country characteristics that determine remittance flows. Expanding the 
interpretational framework of previous papers, the analysis paid particular attention to the 
transfer channel when interpreting the estimation results. 
Using a sending and receiving country fixed effects estimation and including newly 
contructed bilateral determinants of trust, financial and logistic infrastructure and 
informality, the paper spotlights the mutual importance of both countries when 
determining the cost of remittances. Applying methods from the trade literature, the 
estimation results confirm that high levels of social capital, a well-developed infrastructure 
                                                          
3 Subsample regressions on remittance passages among only OECD countries, or only non-OECD 
countries, as well as passages between rich and poor countries (not reported) did not yield any consistent 
differences in significance.  
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and a strong informal economy contribute to switching from one channel of delivery to the 
other.  
Policy makers can try to promote remittances by strengthening factors that decrease 
the cost of both formal and informal flows, without being misled by the fact that some 
elements only change the transmission channel rather than decreasing or increasing the full 
volume.  Additionally, papers that try to analyse the effect of remittances on economic 
development should include bilateral cost-factors in order to control for the channel versus 
size effect. 
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